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RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
BY STANLEY LAW SABEL*

T

HE general scope of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act has
been widely examined.' The present writer is in accord with
the conclusion that it "represents substantial advance in the
practice of reorganization. ' 2 He has viewed it as a procedural
reform which does not change greatly the substance of reorganization law. 3 The fact that rules of the substantive law of reorganization lend themselves less readily to change seems a tribute
to their inherent soundness in relation to economic theories underlying the social structure.4 However, the fact remains that either
because of or in spite of the Corporate Reorganizations Act, the
theories of reorganization law have not remained static. Indeed,
by crystallizing the functions of the court, the Act has served to
bring the real'y vital questions to the fore. These questionsbasically economic-are two:
(1) When is it proper to reorganize? How long must a debtor
continue to struggle before he may seek the beneficent arm of
bankruptcy moratorium? How long must a creditor wait before
he can ask for a re-shuffle?
*Member of the Massachusetts and New York Bars.
'See for instance Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reor-

ganization Act, (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 39; Weiner, Corporate Reorganization: Section 77B 'of the Bankruptcy Act, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1173.
'Weiner, Corporate Reorganizations: section 77B of the Bankruptcy
Act, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 1173.
3Sabel, The Corporate Reorganizations Act, (1934) 19 MINxNSoT
IAw Rvmw 34.

4"Notwithstanding the somewhat haphazard conditions under which
reorganization processes have developed, the precedents and customs, arising
outside of formal court procedure, yet acknowledged and approved by court
decisions, have withstood changes in financial practice better than many
other financial usages developed in the closing decades of the nineteenth
century." Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations, 3d ed., p. 1100.
5Bankruptcy Act, sec. 77B, 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 207; Mason's U. S.
Code, supp. no. 3, tit. 11, sec. 207; hereinafter reference to portions of section 77B will be by subdivision.
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(2) How is a debtor to be reorganized? What is fair and
equitable for each class of claimants?
Each of these questions, which, it may be reiterated, are in
the last analysis more economic than legal, may arise under the
Act in a number of different ways.0 The answers, however, do
not depend upon how the questions arise but tend to be uniform.,
The important questions remain wzhen and how. The cases answering these questions not only give the crux of the current case law
development under section 77B but also give interesting examples
of legal rules being moulded by economic needs.
I.

WHEN A CORPORATION

MAY REORGANIZE

Suppose: (1) A corporation with property worth $1,000,000
is indebteded on a single bond issue which greatly exceeds this
figure and is secured by a first mortgage on substantially all the
corporate property. The bondholders have organized a protective group which (desiring foreclosure) opposes reorganization
under section 77B and specifically objects to all plans proposed
by the junior-lien or the equity holders.

(2) A corporation with property worth $1,000,000 has no
secured debts outstanding. It has, however, unsecured claims
against it which greatly exceed the value of its property. The
unsecured creditors have organized a protective group which (desiring liquidation) opposes reorganization under section 77B and
specifically objects to all plans proposed by the equity holders.
The first situation was never much trouble in receivership reorganizations. Mortgagees could always foreclose their mortgages.8 Such foreclosure was the normal way in which the old
6
Under sec. 77B the question of when to reorganize may arise tinder
subdivision (a) in connection with a determination of "good faith ;" it may
arise under subdivision (c) (10) in connection with a determination of
whether or not proceedings should be enjoined.
The question of how a corporation should be reorganized is primarily
a question which would arise under subdivision (f) in connection with the
confirmation of a plan of reorganization. It might, however, arise under
subdivision (a) in determining the possibility of reorganization as bearing
upon "good faith," or it might arise under subdivision (c) (10). Furthermore,7 subdivision (f) embodies references to subdivisions (d) and (e).
For example, if the court determines the debtor to be insolvent for the
purpose of dispensing with stockholders' assents to a plan of reorganization,
it would hardly regard a plan as unfair to stockholders. See, however, In
re Reading Hotel Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 470, infra p. 137.
sCravath, The Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders' and Stockholders' Protective Committees; and Voluntary Recapitalization of Corporations, in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and

Regulation 153, 161.
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line reorganizations were carried out.9 The first mortgagees could
foreclose and if their bid was sufficient take over the mortgaged
property and not allow other creditors or stockho!ders to participate
with them in such property. 10 Reorganizations, in which the other
claimants were allowed to participate, were resorted to where the
more spartan procedure was uneconomic."1
The second situation was sometimes very troublesome. Where
the corporation is insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, the appoint9"It rarely happens in the United States that foreclosures of railroad
mortgages are anything else than the machinery by which arrangements
between creditors and other parties in interest are carried into effect."
Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard, (1883) 109 U. S. 527, 539, 3 Sup. Ct.
363, 27 L. Ed. 1020.
'OLouisville Trust Company v. Louisville A. & C. R. Co., (1899) 174
U. S.674, 19 Sup. Ct. 827, 43 L. Ed. 1130. This is implicit in Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
In New York Trust Co. v. Continental & Com. Trust & Say. Bank, (C.C.A.
8th Cir., 1928) 26 F. (2d), 872, 874-5, certiorari denied (1928), 278 U. S.
644, 49 Sup. Ct.80, 73 L, Ed. 558, this proposition was ably stated by Judge
Phillips: "The right of the holders of securities secured by a first mortgage
lien to insist on the foreclosure of their lien, the sale of the property, and
the application of the proceeds to the payment of such securities is recognized
in the authorities upon which appellants rely. See Kansas City Terminal
Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., (1926) 271 U. S.445, 454, 46 Sup.
Ct. 549, 70 L. Ed. 1028; Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville A. & C. R. Co.,
(1899) 174 U. S.674, 683, 19 Sup. Ct. 827, 43 L. Ed. 1130; Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., (D.C. Mo. 1916) 238 Fed. 812, 814; Gay v. Hudson
River Electric Power Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1911) 184 Fed. 689, 693, 694.
"In Railways Co. v. Union Trust Co., supra, the Supreme Court said:
'If the bondholder wishes to foreclose, and exclude inferior lienholders or
general unsecured creditors and stockholders, he may do so.'
"In Guaranty Trust Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., supra, the court said:
'There is no doubt but that bondholders have a right, upon default to a
strict foreclosure and sale according to the terms of their mortgages and
the applicable statutes, and to leave the holders of junior securities, unsecured creditors, and stockholders to protect themselves as best they can.'
"If such was the relief sought, and if the sale was bona fide and fairly
conducted, we fail to see how junior incumbrancers or creditors or stockholders may complain under the facts in the instant case."
See Note (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 391, 393.
A recent example of a reorganization plan under which the senior lien
holders are to foreclose and take over all the assets of a company is found
in that proposed in connection with the Camden Rail and Harbor Terminal
Corporation receivership. The liabilities of the old company, in addition to
certain small current liabilities, consisted of first mortgage bonds, debentures
and notes payable. The company also had outstanding preferred and common stock. The reorganization agreement, dated November 1, 1933, provided for a foreclosure of the first mortgage and purchase of the property,
substantially all of which was included in the mortgage, by a committee
acting solely for holders of the first mortgage bonds. The plan specifically
provided that none of the security holders except holders of the first mortgage
bonds should participate in the plan of reorganization. See 1935 Poor's
Industrial Volume 1346-1347.
l"Various reasons may be suggested: (1) The need for new money,
(2) desire to include unmortgaged assets in the reorganization enterprise.

(3) desire to avoid expensive and protracted legislation, (4) desire to pre-

serve stockholders' goodwill in cases where stockholders are also customers.
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ment of a receiver is an act of bankruptcy.1 2 It was because of
the different definitions of insolvency prevailing in bankruptcy
and in equity that all receiverships could not be upset in this
manner.' 3 It was the danger of such attack that made the careful pleader in his petition for a "consent receivership" add to the
statement of inability to meet debts as they matured an allegation
of a surplus of assets over liabilities at a fair valuation . 4 All this
is elementary, but the haphazard procedural growth of the law
which caused this peculiar situation was probably the outgrowth
of economic realities. 15 That is, if the difficulties which beset a
particular business are temporary or due to maladjustments in
capital arrangement, they should be adjusted by reorganization;
if they are permanent and due to the enterprise being economically
unjustifiable, the business should be liquidated as speedily as
12 Bankruptcy Act sec. 3(b) subdivision (5). Prior to the amendment
of 1926 this particular "act of bankruptcy" required that a receiver be appointed "because of insolvency." Such was not likely to be the case as
equity receivers were not appointed because of insolvency in the bankruptcy
sense. The amendment changed this. See National Refining Co. v. Penn
Petroleum Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 914. However, insolvency need only exist at the time the receiver is appointed; in spite of
sec. 3(c) of the Bankruptcy Act insolvency need not exist at the time of
the filing of the petition. See West Company v. Lea, (1899) 174 U. S.
590, 19 Sup. Ct. 836, 43 L. Ed. 1098 (so holding in respect to a general assignment for the benefit of creditors).
13 "When the Bankrupt Act, then, uses the word 'insolvent' in describing
an act of bankruptcy, the meaning to be given to the word is obviously the
meaning that is demanded by the Bankrupt Act itself. It follows that a
consent receivership, although instituted because of the corporation's insolvency as generally understood,-that is, because of the corporation's
inability to pay its debts as they will fall due,-is not an act of bankruptcy.
Hence the astute pleader who draws the bill of complaint for a consent
receivership is careful to allege that the corporation's difficulties are due
only to the fact that it is unable to meet its maturities, with the precautionary statement added that the total of the company's assets, at a fair
valuation, is in excess of its liabilities. On a bill so drawn the corporation
can be adjudged a bankrupt only if it is shown, dehors the record in the
equity court, that, when the bill was filed, the corporation in fact was insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, that is, the total of its assets, at a fair
valuation, was less than the sum of its debts. In that case, and then only.
can it be said that the receiver was appointed 'while (the corporation was)
insolvent', and hence an act of bankruptcy was committed." Glenn, The
Law Governing Liquidation 278.
14
Supra, note 13. "On information and belief, the fair value of the
assets of the defendant is in excess of the amount of its outstanding bonds,
notes and other obligations and indebtedness, but the defendant has not
now on hand sufficient moneys with which to meet its obligations now due
and which will shortly become due and can now not realize sufficient money
for such purpose through the sale of its properties or by borrowing further
moneys." Bill of Complaint in American Steamship Company v. Wickwire
Spencer Steel Company (D.C. N.Y. 1927) reprinted in Clark, A Treatise
on the Law and Practice of Receivers, 2 ed., p. 1587, quoted portion at 1589.
15 See note 4 supra.
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possible. 16 Temporary difficulties or capital maladjustment could
usually be remedied before the enterprise became insolvent in the
bankruptcy sense. Rarely where bankruptcy was available would
all creditors agree not merely to an alternative method of liquidation 17 but also to reorganization.'
Reorganization was usually
limited to the situation where it was, roughly speaking, the best
economic solution at hand.
How does section 77B affect these situations? As to the first,
the Act provides that suits, pending or otherwise, to foreclose a
mortgage may be enjoined 9 and provides that a plan when confirmed is binding upon secured creditors.2 0 The alternative of unconditional foreclosure is thus apparently taken away. How
does this affect the substantive rights of secured creditors? Where
two-thirds of a class of secured creditors assent to a proposed
16Cf. Gerdes, "Good Faith" in the Initiation of Proceedings Under
Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, (1935) 23 Geo. L. J. 417, 421:
".. . reorganization is intended to preserve and continue a going business
and that in the usual case reorganization is advisable only where, although
the fixed charges exceed the current earnings, a going concern value still
exists. When such earnings fall below both the current operating expenses
and the fixed charges, and the condition is not temporary, it is clear that
the case
is one for liquidation rather than for reorganization."
7
1 Such voluntary liquidations are illustrated by common law com-

positions and by assignments for the benefit of creditors. This latter is,
of course, an act of bankruptcy. So, if all danger of bankruptcy is to be
avoided, a creditors' agreement is necessary to make either of these effective. See Glenn, The Law Governing Liquidation. Chs. IX "Composition
with Creditors at Common Law" and X "Assignment for Benefit of Creditors
(General Assignment) at Common Law and Under Statute."
'SThe difficulty of getting unanimous consent is illustrated by the fact
that in most cases voluntary reorganizations without judicial proceedings
were viewed as impracticable. See Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations:
Certain Developments of the Last Decade, in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation 133, 179; Dewing, Financial
Policy of Corporations, 3rd ed., p. 1268: "Invariably some creditors refuse
to participate in a plan, no matter how fair, and by threatening to bring legal
action against the corporation 'hold up' the committee and force the purchase of their claims. This is another way of saying that unanimity of action among a large number of creditors is practically impossible to attain, and
some judicial or at least some administrative authority clothed with power
must necessarily arbitrate between the will of a majority and a minority
bent on achieving their individual ends."
1'Subdivision (c) provides: "The judge ...
(10) . .. may, upon notice
and for cause shown, enjoin or stay the commencement or continuance
of any judicial proceeding to enforce any lien upon the estate until after
final decree."
2

oSubdivision

(g) provides: "Upon such confirmation the provisions

of the plan and of the order of confirmation shall be binding upon (1) the
debtor, (2) all stockholders thereof, including those who have not, as well
as those who have, accepted it, and (3) all creditors, secured or unsecured,
whether or not affected by the plan, and whether or not their claims shall
have been filed, and, if filed, whether or not approved, including creditors
who have not, as well as those who have, accepted it."
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plan, the substantive nature of the change depends upon how important one regards the protection given to minorities by the upset
price under the old procedure." Where two-thirds of a class of
such creditors have not assented, the situation becomes especially
interesting. In the situation first supposed, it seems that the
secured creditors are in effect the owners of the mortgaged property. (The value at which they can take it over will, of course,
be determinative on the amount of their claim against unsecured
assets-that, however, is not of immediate concern here.)1 2 Three
of the methods provided in the Act for alternative satisfaction of
creditors of a class of which less than two-thirds assent to a plan
of reorganization fully recognizes the rights of the secured creditors in our first supposed case as owners. 23 The fourth, providing
satisfaction "by such method as will in the opinion of the judges,
under and consistent with the circumstances of the particular case,
equitably and fairly provide such protection,"" might mean anything. Viewing the rights in the security as substantive,2" it is
arguable that this method does not add greatly to the other methods
stated in the Act. This problem was before the court in In re
Murel Holding Corporation.26 The case involved an appeal from
an order denying a motion to vacate a stay of a foreclosure suit.
The order was reversed, the court holding in effect that the stay
shou!d have been vacated. The factual setup was very similar to
that in our first supposed case with the secured creditors objecting
to reorganization and wishing to proceed with foreclosure. It was
21Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 132; Sabel, The Corporate Reorganiza-

tion Act, (1934)

19
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34, 43

". . .

under the old

practice a distributive share of the proceeds of a judicial sale was never an
in any true sense of the word."
alternative
22
Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 132, 147 points out that one function
of the upset price is to determine the bondholders' rights, qua deficiency
judgment, against unmortgaged assets.
23Subdivision (b) (5) provides for such alternative satisfaction "... if
the property affected by such interests, claims, or liens is dealt with by the
plan, either as provided in the plan (a) by the transfer or sale of such
property subject to such interests, claims, or liens, or by the retention of
such property by the debtor subject to such interests, claims, or liens, or
(b) by a sale free of such interests, claims, or liens at not less than a fair
upset price and the transfer of such interests, claims, or liens to the proceeds of such sale; or (c) by appraisal and payment either in cash of the
value either of such interests, claims, or liens, or, at the objecting creditors'
election, of the securities allotted to such interests, claims, or liens under the
plan,2 if any shall be so allotted.
4Subdivision (b) (5) (d).
25See Oil Fields Syndicate v. American Improvement Co., (C.C.A.
9th Cir.
1919) 260 Fed. 905; note, (1932) 17 MINNESOTA LAW REViEW 47.
26
In re Murel Holding Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 941.
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apparently urged that the plan favored by stockholders and by
unsecured creditors would give "adequate protection" to the secured creditors in that it provided for full payment to them in
ten years with interest in the meantime. The court held that such
was not the meaning of the "adequate protection" clause, saying -2
"In construing so vague a grant, we are to remember not only
the underlying purposes of the section, but the constitutional limitation to which it must conform. It is plain that 'adequate protection' must be completely compensatory...."
The Murel Case irustrates the problem which confronts a court
in determining whether to restrain foreclosure pending reorganization. It is, of course, always possible that eventually a plan may
be proposed to which the requisite number of the class of secured
creditors containing the objectors will assent."8 How far should a
court enjoin or continue an injunction against foreclosure because
of this possibility? The courts which have considered this question
answer that not for very long should a creditor's right to foreclose
be restrained where there is not some showing that an acceptable
plan will be forthcoming. Where there is nothing else shown, the
situation is summarized very nicely in the language of the court
in the Murel Case. ". . . A stay should never be the automatic
result of the petition itself . . ."2" The same situation was before
27
1n re Murel Holding Corp., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 941,
942. 2
See In re Island Park Associates, Inc., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 77
F. (2d) 334. That case involved an appeal from several orders, one of

which enjoined foreclosure. The debtor had proposed a plan which had not

been affirmatively rejected by creditors. In affirming the orders below the
court stressed this fact. "The class of creditors represented by the

appellants can, if they wish, accept or reject it [the plan], but until they have
had the opportunity to vote and express their decision, we should not reject

the plan in advance of their consideration." In connection with the requirement in subdivision (a) that a petition or answer be filed in "good faith"

a similar rationale has been suggested to the effect that a difference exists

between non-action and affirmative disapproval. See Gerdes, "Good Faith"
in the Initiation of Proceedings Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,
(1935) 23 Geo. L. J. 417, 426-7: "If a petition under section 77B is filed by
the required number of creditors holding the necessary amount of provable
claims, it can not be said to have been filed in bad faith merely because
the claims of the petitioning creditors represent but a small proportion of the
total indebtedness of the debtor. The statute has set up definite requirements
in this respect and if these requirements are met no valid objection may
usually be made. But when the petitioners represent only a small proportion of the total claims against the corporation, and the proceedings are

opposed in good faith by a majority of all the creditors, it is apparent that
a feasible plan of reorganization will not be adopted and that the proceedings will be futile. In such a case, therefore, the petition should be dismissed."
29
1n

943.

re Murel Holding Corp., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 941,
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the court in In re Coney Island Hotel Corporation.80 In that case
the lien holders were resisting 77B proceedings. The lower court
had stayed a foreclosure suit. On appeal this order was reversed,
the court saying :31
"It is conceivable that when the plan of reorganization is submitted it may offer a sufficient substitute for the lien of the mortgage. We leave that question open to the consideration of the
district court when the question arises. But as it now stands, the
case is in line with In re Mutrel Holding Corporation, except that
there is even less reason to grant a stay. The foreclosure was
going on for nearly eighteen months before the petition was filed,
and it had been possible to file it for nearly six months. No plan
has been prepared; the debtor apparently supposed that the mere
filing of the petition was enough to stop the foreclosure. This is
not so."
This problem has arisen in different ways. In In re 235 West
46th Street Co. Inc., 2 commonly known as the Paramount Hotel
Case, the first mortgage bondholders succeeded in getting the petition dismissed. Proceedings for reorganization had been brought
by the debtor after a receiver of rents and profits had been appointed in a foreclosure proceeding in a state court. The trustee
tinder the mortgage claimed that there was no equity in the property above the mortgage debt. Four plans of reorganization were
presented, none of which met the approval of the court. 'he
property had failed to earn taxes and interest on the first mortgage.

The court said :33

"It was the purpose of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act to
protect creditors and the debtor's equity in its property against
possible injury traceable to frozen asset problems. If the owners
of such interests are to be protected, it becomes their duty to
formulate some plan which would result in the maximum safety
and security for lienors and creditors of the debtor. A plan should
be forthcoming with reasonable promptness; otherwise the debtor
does not bring its case within the section .... We are not warranted

in believing that there is a reasonable prospect for a reorganization
beneficial to all. To grant more time, there must be a showing
that there is a fair opportunity to sustain the appellee's claim that
the corporation can be reorganized for the benefit of all. We think
the liberal powers conferred by the section and their exercise in
enjoining foreclosure of the first mortgage should no longer stay
the appellants. It would be an abuse of the powers granted by
section 77B, under the circumstances found in this case, to further
o(C.C.A. 2nd
I(C.C.A. 2nd
12(C.CA. 2nd
33(C.C.A. 2nd

Cir.
Cir.
Cir.
Cir.

1935)
1935)
1935)
1935)

76 F. (2d) 126.
76 F. (2d) 126, 127.
74 F. (2d) 700.
74 F. (2d) 700, 701-702.
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stay the appellants in the hope that eventually some other plan
of reorganization might be proposed."
A petition or answer under section 77B in order to be approved
must be filed in "good faith." 4 It is under this requirement that
the remaining authorities are to be found establishing the proposition that in many cases the secured creditor's right of foreclosure

is sti'l available. 35 A number of these "good faith" cases, in their
holding that some showing of the possibility of a successful reorganization is necessary, are in point here."0 They of course do
not stand for the proposition that in order to support a petition
a plan must already have been formulated.3 7 Such is obviously
not the spirit of the Act. They do mean, however, that junior
creditors (or stockholders acting through the debtor) cannot in
situations like the case first supposed, where they have no real
equity in the assets, delay the rights of the real owners. " Such a
holdup game does not constitute "good faith" as the courts view
39
it.

34

Subdivision (a).
35See note (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 293 reviewing many cases
and suggesting that they go too far in allowing dismissal to be granted
on a showing that petitioners cannot obtain the requisite percentage of backing to present or formulate a plan of their own. This overlooks the fact
that to approve such a petition would serve no useful purpose.

361n re Texas Gas Utilities Co., (D.C. Tex. August 13, 1934) not
officially reported, see C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed., par.
2688.01, 3014; In re Mo. Kan. Pipe Line Co., (D.C. Ill.1934) (report of
Special Master) not officially reported; In re Coronado Hotel Co., (D.C. Mo.
1934) not officially reported, see C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed.,
par. 3002; In re Electric Public Service Co. (D.C. Del. 1934) 9 F. Supp.
128:- "A possibility of reorganization must exist to meet the test of good
faith"; In re Bush Terminal Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 315: "If it
becomes reasonably apparent, after a sufficient time, that no such plan can
be presented, then it will be the duty of this court, on due notice, to dismiss
the petition and relegate the debtor to such other procedure as may be
found to be most applicable for a termination of the controvery in this
court." Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d)
284: "The question here is whether there may be reasonably applied to
the debtor some feasible and practicable plan of reorganization. If not.
there is no occasion to invoke the benefits of the Act. We do not mean to
say that the petitioners cannot be heard unless they have a reorganization
plan fully worked out and ready for immediate consideration, but it is essential to show that one may be forthcoming." In re Grigsby-Grunow Co..
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 200.
37
1n re South Coast Company, (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 43; In re
Flamingo Hotel Co., (D.C. Ill. 1934) not officially reported, see C. C. H.
Bankrutcy Law Service, new ed.. par. 3007; In re Bush Terminal Co.,
D.C. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 315; Manati Sugar Co. v..Mock, (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 284.
38
The difference in such a situation lies in the affirmative dissent by
a dominating class. See cases cited note 36, supra.
39
See Judge Mack's opinion in In re Associated Gas & Electric Co.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1934) not officially reported, see C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law
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In the second supposed situation, where the corporation is insolvent in the bankruptcy sense and thus, theoretically at least,
liquidation more fitting,4 the alternative of old line bankruptcy
is limited by section 77B. Petitions or answers under section 77B
may be filed in pending bankruptcy proceedings, and if approved
the proceedings come under the new Act.4 '

Reorganization is

now paramount to bankruptcy, and this remains so until the proceedings are dismissed. 42 What of the second supposed situation,
especially where the enterprise in question is economically unjustified? Aside from the possibility that creditors may successfully
block any reorganization plan, it is obviously highly undesirable
to allow reorganization moratoria to delay inevitable liquidation. 43
The Act provides that a voluntary petition or answer must state
facts showing need for relief thereunder. 44 So far the courts,
ignoring this, have broadly placed this type of case along with
types previously considered and hold that a petition showing no
possibility of reorganization is not filed in "good faith." ' 43

Cases

where this reasoning is applied because of the existence of other
liquidation or reorganization proceedings which may have con4
tinued for some time are especially analogous. 1
The only recognition which the older law gave to the proposition that an economically unjustifiable enterprise should not be
Service, new ed., par. 3057, affirmed on reargument, see C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service new ed., par. 3085: "But even more than that, I think
the requirement of good faith was intended to prevent strike suits against
corporations. The requirement of good faith is aimed more than anything
else at the racketeers both in and out of the legal profession, or to prevent
racketeering through the use of legal process in the case of corporations
which have because of the times reached a state of insecurity for the
creditors."
40
Cf. note 16, supra; lack of ability to earn current operating expenses
usually accompanies bankruptcy insolvency, see note 92 infra.
41Subdivision (a).
42Subdivision (b) (8).
43Liquidation is inevitable when, as in our supposed case, a dominant
class objects and it is not practicable to give such class alternative satisfaction
without ending the possibility of reorganization. In re Murel Holding
Corp., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 941.
44A creditors' petition need not show this; it must, however, show the
existence of a pending bankruptcy proceeding or equity receivership or that
the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy, Subdivision (a).
- 5This is probably because in many cases petitions are filed by creditors
who, as noted in note 44, supra, need not allege need for relief. 'hus in
In re Grigsby-Grunow Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 200, all
creditors except the petitioning creditors admitted that reorganization was
impossible and that liquidation was inevitable. The court was forced to
base its dismissal of the creditors' petition on the fact that it was not
filed 46in good faith. See other cases cited in note 36, supra.
In re Electric Public Service Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 128.

CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS

reorganized was in the rule that in certain situations bankruptcy
was paramount." Thus it was that where an act of bankruptcy,
such as the appointment of a receiver while the corporation was insolvent, had occurred, bankruptcy lay at the election of petitioning creditors. The law as it is developing under section 77B appears to give greater recognition to the economics of the situation.
Regardless of insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, reorganization
proceedings will only be dismissed where liquidation is the more
48
economic solution.

Suppose: A corporation with property worth $1,000,000 has
debts somewhat under this sum which for the most part are not
presently due. The corporation has sufficient working capital to
meet present interest obligations and current maturities, but tile
going seems hard from the stockholder's point of view. This may
be taken as illustrating a situation not yet ripe for reorganization.
Creditors have a right to insist that their debtor continue to struggle
up to a certain point. This is illustrated in other fields of creditors'
rights.4 9 It has until recently been something of an inarticulate
premise in receivership cases.50 It is submitted that it formed
part of the background for the early dicta limiting consent receivership.51 Recently the Supreme Court of the United States
has expressed itself more definitely, 52 and finally it has made it
clear that insolvency in the equity sense whether present or prospective is essential for this type of receivership. 3
There have been few cases on this under section 77B. Prospective insolvency three months off is apparently sufficient.5 ' On
the other hand, it has been held that petitioners who bought bonds
for the purpose of suit and waived the security thereon were not
creditors at all. 55 This is surprising in view of the broad provi4"Gross v. Irving Trust Company, (1933) 289 U. S. 342, 344, 53 Sup. Ct.
605, 77 L. Ed. 1243.
4SSee note 45, supra.
49
This is illustrated by the rule prevailing in many jurisdictions that a
release clause in a general assignment invalidates the transfer, i.e., converts it
into a fraudulent conveyance. See Glenn, The Law Governing Liquidation
197.
5°Harkin v. Brundage, (1928) 276 U. S. 36, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72 L. Ed.

457. 51

See Sabel, Equity Jurisdiction in the United States Courts with
Reference to Consent Receiverships, (1934) 20 Iowa L. Rev. 83, 91.
5-Shapiro v. Wilgus, (1932) 287 U. S. 348, 53 Sup. Ct. 142, 77 L. Ed.

355.

53First
54 Sup. Ct.
511n
re
55
In re
51, affirmed

Nat'l Bk. of Cincinnati v. Flershem, (1934) 290 U. S. 504,
298, 78 L. Ed. 465.
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., (D.C. Md. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 414.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., (D.C. Pa. 1934) 8 F. Supp.
sub. nom. Wilson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., (C.C.A.
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sions in section 77B as to intervention which would seem greatly
to reduce any danger of collusion."G One court has said by way
of dictum that a petition is not brought in "good faith" when
brought against a corporation not in need of reorganization.Y A
similar rule would probably apply to a voluntary petition. About
all that can be said in answer to the supposed case is that where
a corporation does not need reorganizing it should not be allowed
to reorganize.
Under the old procedure the chief danger was thought to be
that of collusion resulting in unneeded reorganizations involving
unnecessary moratoria.58 The courts were careful to guard against
this. The danger remains under the new procedure but in greatly
reduced form.5 9 The chief danger now lies not in unnecessary
3rd Cir. 1934) not officially reported, see C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service
new 5ed.,
par. 3024.
6
Subdivision (a) and Subdivision (c) (11). Cf. In re Garment
Center Capitol, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1935) not officially repprted, see C. C. H.
Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed., par. 3472, where the court denied an individual creditor leave to intervene, saying: "No facts are furnished to
sustain an application to intervene. The petitioner, without intervention,
is entitled to notice of hearing on any proposed plan of reorganization. The
statute so provides. So far as concerns the facts disclosed the petitioner
needs5 7 nothing but an opportunity to be heard on such a plan."
1n re South Coast Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 43. However,
it is, of course, sufficient that the debtor is unable to meet its debts as
they mature. Subdivision (a). Thus need for organization does not require bankruptcy insolvency. An interesting discussion of tileeconomic
background for this is found in Judge Chesnut's opinion in In re KellySpringfield Tire Co., (D.C. Md. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 414, 417. "The great
purpose of the statute is to prevent a sinking corporation from drowning.
And it is with that idea that the courts of the United States are instructed
to lend their aid to save a financially drowning corporation. If they are
dead, then, of course, there is only bankruptcy for them. But while there
is life there is always hope, financially as well as physically. So that I do
not think it is necessary that a corporation should have no hope whatever
of successful financial rehabilitation in order to justify its coming into
court. It is an old saying in the law that an ounce of prevention is worth
a pound of cure, and I think that was the underlying thought of Congress in
passing this legislation-it was to be of help to corporations and endeavor
to rehabilitate them, having in mind that the best interests of their creditors
lie along that line. Every one knows, of course, that every modern industrial enterprise of any size is of value only as a going concern. Bricks,
mortar and machinery are a liability and not an asset unless they can be
made productive, productive for the benefit of their wage employes, for the
members of society in the community, to keep them off Relief rolls, and
productive for the benefit of the proprietors of the business and for the
purpose of paying interest on the organization's obligations.
So it is
very, very clear that in applying the substance or intention of this Act
we do not have to wait until a corporation is absojutely insolvent."
That a "solvent" corporation may reorganize if unable to meet its debts
as they mature was held in In re New Rochelle Coal & Lumber Co. (C.C.A.

2nd Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 881.
58
See note 53, supra.
59

See note 57, supra, the requirement of "good faith" in the Act pre-
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reorganization but at the other end of the scale in reorganization
where something more drastic is needed.60 The courts have made
a sensible beginning in their interpretation of the restrictions which
section 77B places on both foreclosure and old line bankruptcy
liquidation.6 1 Several decades of judicial decisions have restricted
equity receiverships as steps in reorganizations to situations where
reorganization is economically desirable.62 We are now witnessing
the beginning of a similar limitation of statutory reorganizations
which would likewise limit such reorganizations to those economically desirable. 61 The difference, of course, as already pointed out,
is that the limitations on the new Act are to prevent its being used
in place of foreclosure or liquidation where the latter are more desirable. The rules themselves cannot yet be reduced entirely to
formula. Broadly speaking, it may be said that reorganizations, as
always, slwuld be lintited to economically justifiable enterpriscs
which could not get along without such adjustments. Detailed
application of this general theory to situations under the new Act
has already begun, and it is in such application as in those already
examined that we find the beginnings of the answer to the question
of when may a corporation reorganize.

II. How A CORPORATION MAY REORGANIZE
This topic includes chiefly a consideration of the fairness of a
plan of reorganization in the broadest sense of that term.6 '
We have come a long way in reorganization law since it was
first said that courts will not write reorganization plans for the
parties.6 5 Nevertheless, although such plans even before the new
vents approval by the courts of petitions against corporations not in need of
reorganization.
60
See cases cited in note 36, supra.
61
See discussion of first two supposed cases, pages 118 to 127, supra.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
G4Subdivision (f) of the Act deals with confirmation of the plan. The
provisions of this subdivision which are pertinent to our present problem
are: "After hearing such objections as may be made to the plan, the judge
shall confirm the plan if satisfied that (1) it is fair and equitable and does
not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders.
and is feasible; (2) it complies with the provisions of subdivision (b) of
this section; (3) it has been accepted as required by the provisions of subdivision (e), clause (1) of this section; (4) the provisions of subdivision
(e), clause (2) of this section have been complied with . . . (6) the offer
of the plan and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made
by any means or promises forbidden by this Act."
or procured
65
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. International Steam Pump Co., (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1916) 231 Fed. 594 the court affirmed the decree below and quoted
the opinion of Mayer, District Judge, in which he said: ". . . courts are not
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Act were subjected to increasingly close judicial scrutiny, it remained in the main true that courts would not write reorganization
plans.6 6 The same is true under the new Act.07 Under a laissez
faire economic regime anything else could not be imagined."8 No
one would doubt that in the kindred field of new financing the
allocation of securities between promoters, bankers and the ultimate furnishers of the new money is a matter for individual barempowered to make contracts for parties in interest, nor can courts adjudge or decree the terms upon which a mortgagee may allow to junior
lienors, or others, participation in his mortgaged property when failure to
pay the debt due him brings that property under the hammer.
"It is rare that any reorganization is satisfactory to all concerned; for,
in the nature of things, when there is not on hand enough to satisfy every
obligation in full, some, and perhaps all, must suffer more or less; but, in
the absence of fraud in the inception or a fraudulent scheme to which
court proceedings are necessary incidents, the field in which the battle for
respective adjustments must be fought out is beyond the court room, for
the court can only ask whether, without the aid of fraud or unlawful means,
the debt is really and justly due.
"It is clear, therefore, that the court cannot directly or indirectly rewrite this reorganization agreement and I should not state something so
obvious, were it not for the fact that the argument, so urgently pressed.
comes down to that. The charges of fraud and collusion are not only not
sustained, but are affirmatively disproved, as the record abundantly shows."
1926)
6"Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (D.C. Ill.
15 F. (2d) 434; Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing,
Reorganization and Regulation, 146; Grange, Corporation Law for Officers
and Directors 649-650: "The reorganization plan will usually be worked out
either before or after the decree of foreclosure and sale, by the joint efforts
of the protective committees representing the different classes of creditors
and stockholders whose interests are affected, or by a joint committee made
up of members of each of these protective committees. When the plan has
been formulated, each protective committee submits it to the security holders
whom it represents for approval-usually pursuant to a provision in the
deposit agreement that unless notice of dissent is received within a certain
time the depositor shall be deemed to have assented-and participation inthe
plan may also be invited on the part of those creditors and stockholders
who have not deposited their securities with any protective committee. If
the plan receives substantial support, it will be submitted to the court for its
approval, and a hearing will be held at which persons objecting to the plan
may present their arguments. If the court approves the plan, the sale is
decreed or confirmed, as the case may be, and the property is conveyed
to a new corporation formed for that purpose, which then issues its securities to the various parties in accordance with the terms of the plan."
07The Act provides for the proposal of plans by creditors, stockholders
and the debtor. It contains no provision for the proposal of a plan by the
court. See subdivision (d).
68
That we are still under such a regime is clearly illustrated by the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, (U.S. 1935) 295 U. S.555, 589, 55 Sup. Ct. 854, 863,
holding unconstitutional the Frazier-Lemke Act, Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75(s),
11 U. S. C. A. sec. 203(s), Mason's U. S. Code, title 11, see. 203(s) (July
1935 Year Book Vol. 7, No. 4.), as depriving secured creditors of specific
property rights; "The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive
powers of Congress, is subject to the fifth amendment."
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gaining.6 9 We have rules as to watered stock,7 0 promoters' liability,7 1 fraud,72 etc., which may affect the ultimate result. New
Deal economics may require registration under the Securities Act"'
and with the Securities Exchange Commission7 4 in sundry cases.
The fact remains that determining the financial structure of the
new company is largely a matter of individual initiative."
The
situation is very much the same in the case of a reorganization
plan. The recent emphasis placed by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the necessity in receivership reorganizations of
considering the course and result of operations under the management of the receiver 7 6 might suggest that a like reasoning be applied in determining values for purposes of 77B proceedings. In
69
Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations, 3rd ed., 302 et seq.
7011 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations, perm. ed., secs. 51995258.
711 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations, perm. ed., secs. 193-198.
721 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations, perm. ed., secs. 193-198.
73
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. at L. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. A.
secs. 77a-77mm, Mason's U. S. Code, Supp. No. 3, tit. 15, secs. 77a-77mm.
74Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. at L. 881, 15
U. S. C. A. secs. 78a-78jj, Mason's U. S. Code, Supp. No. 3, tit. 15, sees.
78a-78jj.
75
See note 69, supra. The court, however, in reorganizations under 77B
assumed greater control of committees. Thus in In re Rosenbaum Grain
Co. (D.C. Ill. May 27, 1935) not officially reported, see C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed., par. 3468, the court granted a petition requesting it to appoint a committee to represent creditors, and a committee to
represent stockholders: "The court is generally in the dark as to the method
of the organization of the committee and of the manner in which the committee conducts the affairs of the debtor. Likewise it can know little of the
real merits of the plan of reorganization presented. The court must rely
on the statements of interested parties, on the reports made by the committees, and the statements of creditors in open court. It is exceedingly important therefore that the court have its own representatives on the stockholders' and creditors' committees. Further, it is necessary that the court
have control of the committee and have the right to remove any member who
either through negligence or dishonesty fails to perform the duties of his
office. In this case the court has such a representative on each committee
and by the terms of the draft order presented, the creditors' committee as a
whole
is under the jurisdiction of the court. The order will be signed."
76
National Surety Company v. Coriell, (1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup.
Ct. 678, 77 L. Ed. 1300. See, however, In re New Rochelle Coal & Lumber
Co., (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 881, where the court said: "Our
attention is called to National Surety Co. v.Coriell, (1935) 289 U. S.426,
53 Sup. Ct. 678, 77 L. Ed. 1300, where the court, in an equity receivership
case, remanded to the district court for further proceedings the matter of
reorganization, and criticized the terms of the reorganization in equity receivership there provided for. A reorganization under sec. 77B is statutory
and where there has been compliance with the terms prescribed in the
statute, it is sufficient.
"We think here that the determination that the plan was fair, equitable
and feasible was reached only after full opportunity was accorded to creditors to voice their objections or suggest some more equitable terms. When
that has been done, the statute has been complied with and the court is
authorized to approve the plan. Order affirmed."
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the main this would seem to be true. The argument that might be
drawn from it to the effect that values based upon earnings may be
determined more definitely in the case of enterprises that are being reorganized than in the case of new financing is fallacious. It
loses sight of certain types of new financing such as those involved in the merger of several independent plants which have
long been in operation or the financing of certain types of public
utilities where the course of future operations can be forecast
with almost uncanny accuracy.77 Even in these situations the
parties write their own financial plans. So it is that under the
present economic regime the rule that reorganization plans should
be made by the parties should continue as the cardinal rule of this
aspect of the topic.
The decision of the district court in In re Alleghany Corporation78 illustrates this principle. The reorganization plan funded
five years of bond interest and the unsecured claims of certain
bankers with preferred stock, and provided for the paying off of
other unsecured creditors in cash. The court confirmed the plan,
saying it would disregard certain technical objections apparent to
any lawyer:
"I think you have to take this plan very largely as it is, by
reason of practical considerations; and I must insist from my
point of view that in a big situation like this you must deal with
the big features of it and not with the mere details. I am quite sure
that any of us that are legally trained would be able to suggest
other objections to this plan, or at least other improvements from
the standpoint of the bondholders, in detail."
77
Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations, 3rd ed., p. 178 et seq. and
199 et seq.
78(D.C. Md. 1934) oral opinion, not officially reported.
Certain similar situations should be distinguished. Thus weighing
rival plans and determining which is fairest and most feasible as was (lone
by the Court in In re McCrory Stores Corp., (D.C. N.Y. Nov. 12, 1935)
not yet officially reported, See C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed.
par. 3698, does not amount to judicial plan writing. It might approach
this if a plan could be proposed by a sufficiently small interest. However,
under the act this is not so as only substantial interests can submit plans.
Subdivision (d). It would not seem likely that an alternative plan formally
proposed by the debtor itself would be judicially written. Likewise, modification of a plan along lines suggested by the court is not judicial plan
writing. Modifications of the, plan were suggested by the court in In re
Middle West Utilities Co., (D.C. Ill. Nov. 6, 1935) not yet officially reported, See C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed. par. 3671. Formally
such modifications are by the parties. As a matter of substance the changes
suggested in the case just cited were designed to meet certain specified
objections to the plan. The line is admittedly a hard one to draw, but
it would seem that pointing out how a plan is unfair and can be improved
is not the same as writing a plan. The changes so suggested carry no
judicial mandate.
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Plainly the court did not regard the plan it confirmed as the best
possible. It probably felt that it could have drawn a better one.
The rule, however, is: the parties may reorganize any vay they
wish to so long as their plan is fair and complies generally 'with
the Act. As to the actual plan in the Alleghany Case, payment of
certain unsecured creditors in cash while funding bond interest
in preferred stock seems somewhat arbitrary but was probably
justified by the circumstances of the particular situation. The
court referred to the advantage to the bondholders of not requiring immediate liquidation of their security. That alone would
probably not have been sufficient to make the plan fair. The real
justification was the comparative size of the respective classes."
This practical consideration is doubtless what influenced the court.
The situation was not unlike that existing in the case of "six
months' claims." The case was affirmed on appeal ;aohowever,
it is to be regretted that these points apparently were not raised
or at least were not considered by the circuit court of appeals
when the case came before it. At any rate, the lower court is to
be commended for its eminently practical view of what is necessary in a reorganization plan.
Where the debtor is solvent in the bankruptcy sense, or at
least has not been affirmatively determined to be insolvent in that
sense, a reorganization plan should take some account of whatever
equity there is for the stockholders. 8 A plan not doing so would
be unfair. This is not a situation where the bondholders may take
over the entire property through foreclosure or liquidation. 82 The
most they can insist on against the equity holders is alternative
satisfaction as provided in the Act."'
On the other hand, stockholders' assent to a plan of reorganization may be entirely dispensed with if the debtor is insolvent in
79
Spaeth & Friedberg, Early Developments Under Section 77B, (1935)
30 IIl. L. Rev. 137, 158, applies a de minimis theory to explain excessive
preferences given in many plans to unsecured governmental claims.
8OSub. nom. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 75 F.
(2d) 81947.
In re Hopkins Lake Drive Realty Corp. (D.C. Md. 1934) not officially
reported, see C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed., par 3276: "Equity
and fairness require the debtor corporation to discharge all of its original
obligations which were incurred in good faith. The plan should be modified
to provide for the payment of cumulative and unpaid interest before the
equity in the property is turned over for possible liquidation to the ultimate
owner of the equity." Cf. In re Reading Hotel Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1935)
10 F. Supp. 470.
82Cf. note 10, supra; also see discussion of first two suppositious cases
in topic I supra.
s3Subdivision (b) (5).
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the bankruptcy sense."4 This very sensible rule is obviously based
on considerations that in such a situation stockholders have no true
equity in the property. As might be anticipated, the difficulty
lies in determining insolvency. The bankruptcy definition of such
insolvency-liabilities exceeding assets at a fair valuation 8"-is
not easy of application."' Many different tests have been used by
the courts in determining fair value.8" None of them is entirely
satisfactory. They all involve an attempt to get a value higher
than is obtainable by a forced or distressed sale. 88 Until recently
most of them have ignored the phrase "to pay his debts" in the
bankruptcy definition of insolvency. 89 The difference in the defi84

Subdivision (e) (1).
8-5Bankruptcy Act, sec. 1 (15), 11 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1 (15) : 1 Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 1 (15) "(15) a person shall be deemed insolvent
within the provisions of this Act whenever the aggregate of his property,
exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to
defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not, at a fair valuation, be
sufficient
in amount to pay his debts."
86
Bonbright & Pickett, Valuation to Determine Solvency Under the
Bankruptcy Act, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev., 582; see McGill v. Commercial
Credit Company, (D.C. Md. 1917) 243 Fed. 637, 647. "The effort is to
find out not what a real buyer and a real seller, under the conditions actually
surrounding them, do, but what a purely imaginary buyer will pay a makebelieve seller, under circumstances which do not exist. You are forced to
wonder what would have happened if everything had been different from
what it was. It is not easy to guess what will take place in Wonderland,
as other
people than Lewis Carroll's heroine have found out."
87
Going concern value (in the sense of possibility of future earnings).
In re Nathanson Bros. Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 912; going
concern value (in the sense of the aggregate being worth more than the
sum of its parts), Bergdoll v. Harrigan, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1914) 217 Fed.
943; tax assessment or tax returns (as evidence), Edwards v. Huttig Mfg.
Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1908) 160 Fed. 619; willing seller-willing buyer,
Irving Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1934) 6 F.
Supp. 185; unit break-up value, Updike v. Oakland Motor Car Co.. (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 369; present availability of proceeds, In re
Cooper, (D.C. Mass. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 485; capitalization of earnings (as
evidence), Doyle Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 5 F.
(2d) 918; operating loss or low earnings (as evidence), Lowenstein v.
Salop, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 889; value realized in bankruptcy
(as evidence), Williams v. Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n. (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1932) 55 F. (2d) 884: cost less depreciation (as evidence), Doyle Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 918.
88
Masonite Corp. v. Robinson Slagle Lumber Co., (D.C. La. 1933) 3 F.
Supp. 754; see In re Hopkins Lake Drive Realty Corp., (D.C. Md. 1934)
not officially reported, note 81: ".

.

. the question of insolvency is at least

to be very liberally construed in the interest of the debtor." See Bonbright & Pickett, Valuation to Determine Solvency Under the Bankruptcy Act, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 582.
89The language of the lower court in Stern v. Paper, (D.C. N.D. 1910)
183 Fed. 228, aff'd. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1912) 198 Fed. 642 seems susceptible of
a construction that might indicate that the court viewed values as taken
for the purpose of payment of debts: " 'Fair valuation' within the meaning
of subdivision 15 of section 1 of the bankruptcy act means a value that cali
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nitions of insolvency prevailing in equity and in bankruptcy has
been noted already 0 Neither the equity nor the bankruptcy definition of insolvency accurately expresses the popular meaning of
that term. To a business man a business has either failed or it has
not failed. He is apt to apply either legal test according to which
seems appropriate in a given situation. The economist uses the
same common sense approach as the business nan.9 ' To him, too,
a business is insolvent when it has failed. Regardless of the cause
of the financial difficulty, a business ma)y be said to have failed
when it no longer can go on with any chance of success.
The Supreme Court of the United States as far back as 1900
recognized the connection between the two legal tests of insolvency. "Inability to pay debts in the ordinary course of business," the
court said, "usually accompanies an insufficiency of assets."2" By
this statement the supreme court clearly showed that lack of
working capital (which is really determinative of equity insolvency) was an important factor in determining bankruptcy insolvency. Other federal cases have recognized this."
This type of valuation problem was before the district court
of Indiana in In re Studebaker Corporation." The question was
the insolvency of the automobile manufacturing company there
involved. There was practically no market for its plant as a single
unit. A valuation could not be arrived at by capitalizing earnings
as the corporation was losing money. Break-up value was clearly
less than the outstanding indebtedness. The situation was illusbe made promptly effective by the owner of the property 'to pay his debts'."
The fifth circuit definitely adopted this construction in Mitchell v.

Investment Securities Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933) 67 F. (2d) 669: "Statutory as well as commercial insolvency arises out of, and consists in, in-

ability to pay debts. One is insolvent under the statute when his assets, if
converted into cash, at a fair not forced sale will not pay them. In both
cases solvency is tested by ability to pay debts, in the one case promptlky in
the other, in time. In testing both kinds of insolvency, the realities of the
situation control. In both kinds it is the actual, rather than the theoretical,
condition of the debtor which determines it." (Italics ours.)
9ONote
13, supra.
91
2See Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations, 3rd ed., p. 1088.
9 Pirie v. The Chicago Title & Trust Company, (1900) 182 U. S.438,
451, 93
21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45 L. Ed. 1171.
Doughty v. Rockingham Nat'l Bank, (D.C. N.H., 1933) 2 F. Supp.
213; Mitchell v. Investment Securities Corp., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1933) 67 F.
(2d) 669; Williams v. Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1932)
55 F. (2d) 884; In re Cleveland Discount Co., (D.C. Ohio, 1924) 9 F.
(2d) 97; In re Sedalia Farmers' Coop. Packing & Produce Co., (D.C.
Mo. 1919) 268 Fed. 898; Chicago Motor Vehicle Co. v. American Oak
Leather Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1905) 141 Fed. 518; In re Elmira Steel Co.,
(D.C. N.Y., 1901) 109 Fed. 456; Lowenstein v. Salop, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1932)94 55 F. (2d) 889.
(D.C. Ind. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 426.
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trative of the difficulty of valuing a large business. 5 The court
took a practical view of the situation and dispensed with stockholders' assent to the plan on the ground that the Studebaker Corporation was insolvent.
"A person or corporation is therefore insolvent when he or it is
unable to pay debts, and this inability to pay debts is not temporary, through lack of ready funds, but permanent through lack
of assets convertible in a reasonable time, not necessarily at forced
sale, but nevertheless within a reasonable period. Inso'vency
under the statute and from a commercial standpoint results from
inability to pay. If the assets will not sell on the market within
a reasonable time for enough to liquidate the debts, insolvency
exists."06
The test thus applied is close to the economic concept, which likens
insolvency to business failure, for a business has certainly failed
if it cannot be liquidated within a reasonable time for a sufficient
amount to pay its debts.
95
Spaeth & Friedberg, Early Developments Under Section 7713, (1935)
30 Ill. L Rev. 137, 166, 167: ". .. it is apparent that the difficulty of proving
insolvency will constitute a major obstacle in the path of foreclosing creditors in the reorganization of the utilities and larger industrials." Tle functional analysis of the Studebaker case suggested by Messrs. Spaeth and
Friedberg is broad enough to apply to every reorganization where, broadly
speaking, the public has an interest in the continuance of the business:
"In the Studebaker case two appraisals were made by the receivers; the
first gave Studebaker a going concern value of approximately nineteen and
one-half million dollars, the second, based on liquidation value and 'assuming
that liquidation would be made under conditions where the receivers would
have definite knowledge that it was impending for sonic time in advance of
it being generally known, and that liquidation would be completed withiii
a period of eighteen months,' valued the property at fourteen and threequarter million dollars. As the liabilities totalled over twenty million dollars, Studebaker was 'obviously insolvent' only by the liquidation test. With
out referring to the going concern valuation, the court found the corporation insolvent, stating that when 'the assets will not sell on the market within
a reasonable time for enough to liquidate the debts, insolvency exists.' Tle
court was obviously much influenced by the practical consideration that,
if shareholders were permitted to vote, further delay and expense would
result for aii industry which it was in the public interest to restore to
normal activities as quickly as possible." Cf. the views expressed infra
page 138 as to stockholders coming ahead of outsiders.
96(D.C. Ind., 1935) 9 F. Supp. 426, 427. See In re Reading Hotel Corp.,
(D.C. Pa. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 470, 471. The Master's report found debtor
insolvent. The court overruled exceptions based upon claims that future
potential value should be considered in arriving at insolvency: "Tile more
strongly urged exceptions raise the question that the Master declined to

add to the fair value thus found a potential value which is really based upon
a guess (perhaps not altogether unjustified) that the hotel, by reason of a
past history of wide advertisements, good management, and excellent reputation will, when times improve, make money for its then owners. In effect
the exceptant proposes a new definition of insolvency for that term as it is
used in section 77B. There is nothing in that amendment however which
shows any intention to modify the definition of the original act. Under any
rule of statutory interpretation this would be a sufficient answer."
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It thus seems that concerns which have economically failed as
distinguished from those merely in economic difficulties can be
reorganized without stockholders' assentY7 This is the very type
of business that, as we have previously seen, should be liquidated
rather than reorganized.98 The real economic need where creditors
do not insist on taking the property by foreclosure or otherwise
liquidating it is, of course, new money. Stockholders are usually
the best and often the only source of new money. The stockholders
in such a situation still have some rights. This is illustrated by
99
In re Reading Hotel Corporation.
There the court found the
debtor to be insolvent but expressly left open the question of
whether or not stockholders were entitled to be heard on a question of fairness:
"Although, if the corporation is insolvent, a stockholder should
not ordinarily participate in the assets of the reorganized company
without a new contribution, it may be that considerations of fairness require stockholders to be given preferential rights (as
against outsiders) to come into the new enterprise upon terms.
Without attempting to go further into the matter, there may be
other points from which stockholders of an insolvent corporation
may challenge the fairness of a plan. It is sufficient to say the
Act clearly does not intend them to be wholly disregarded for every
purpose from the moment a finding of insolvency is made."
The creditors cannot object to this. The situation is really in
their control. If enough creditors or classes of creditors had
resisted reorganization, they could probably have obtained foreclosure or liquidation as they might desire. 100 That is the purport
of the first group of cases considered.' 0 '
That the doctrine of the Boyd Case is applicable to reorganiza97
See
9

note 84, supra.
SThat is, where a dominating class of creditors are opposing reorganization. See discussion of first two suppositious cases in topic I, supra.
99(D.C. Pa. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 470, 471.
One of the modifications of the plan suggested by the Court in In re

Middle West Utilities Co. (D.C. Ill. Nov. 6, 1935) not yet officially re-

ported, See C. C. H. Bankruptcy Law Service, new ed. par. 3671, is illustrative of this same point. Wilkerson, *D. J., said: "Even if the debtor is
adjudged to be insolvent, stockholders in my opinion should be given some
additional opportunity to share in the future prosperity of the new company,
if its business turns out to be prosperous. I shall not discuss in detail at
this time the reasons for this conclusion. They involve a consideration of
the proceedings here and in [the] equity case, as well as the treatmentof
the valuation of the property of the company by the proponents of the plan."
He thus went on to say that the stockholders should receive, in addition to
the shares allotted to them, warrants to purchase shares of the new company
at a stated
price.
10 See note 98, supra.
lolIbid.
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tion under section 77B is, of course, obvious. 2 This has been
recognized clearly by writers on the subject 0 3 and by case authority.'04 The "fixed principle" of the Boyd Case never went further
than preserving a rough semblance of the relative status between
the various classes of creditors and stockholders.10 5 It never required that anything be given to the lowest class in a particular
case.10 It has been seen that in many cases fairness under section
77B may require that something be given to every class of creditors
and stockholders.' 0 The amount which would have to be given
to stockholders if such a theory should fully develop is, of course,
variable. In a sense, such a development would be along the
general line of the Boyd Case. Just as creditors come ahead of
stockholders, stockholders come ahead of the general public. Like
the Boyd Case doctrine, it would not require the impossible." 8
The beginning of the development of such a rule may be one of
impelling factors behind the increasingly wide use of warrants in
corporate reorganizations.' 1 9 Such warrants when issued to stockholders give them a chance to share in the enterprise if it turns out
profitably. 10 Though the use of such warrants cannot entirely
displace shorter term rights"' which must necessarily be used
1"2Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554,
57 L. Ed. 931.
"''Spaeth & Friedberg, Early Developments Under Section 77B, (1935)
30 Ill. L. Rev. 137, 154 and 155; Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganization Act, (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 39, 74; Gerdes, A Fair
and Equitable Plan of Corporate Reorganization under section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act, (1934), 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 1; note, The Fair Plan in
Corporate Reorganization, (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 391.
1041n re Hopkins Lake Drive Realty Corp., (D.C. Md. 1934) not officially reported. "Equity and fairness require the debtor corporation to
discharge all of its original obligations which were incurred in good faith.
The plan should be modified to provide for the payment of cumulative and
unpaid interest before the equity in the property is turned over for possible
liquidation to the ultimate owner of the equity."
lOSKansas City Ry. v. Central Union Trust Company, (1926) 271 U. S.
445, 46 Sup. Ct. 549, 70 L. Ed. 1028.
lo6See
note 10, supra.
07

1 1n re Reading Hotel Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1935) 10 F. Stpp. 470.
8
1O
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup.
Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
10 The Associated Telephone Utilities Company reorganization is
typical of the treatment given security holders in reorganizations of large
public utility holding companies. The plan provided for all series of treferred stockholders and common stockholders receiving warrants, in various
proportions, which in effect constituted calls for the stock of the new General Telephone Corporation (the Corporation formed to carry out the Plan)
good until November 1, 1948. See Petition of Reorganization Committee
for confirmation of plan, filed March 15, 1935 (order entered May 13, 1935).
11OIbid.

"'Thus the preferred stockholders in the Associated Telephone Utilities Company Reorganization were also given rights, in different proportions
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where immediate new money is needed, they serve in many cases
to give the stockholders something more tangible."1 2 They place
the stockholder ahead of the outsider for a longer period. Implications from the dicta in the Reading Hotel Case would carry
the "fixed principle" in the Boyd Case further than it has been
carried hitherto. Still further developments may be expected. Fairness will probably never become an entirely static concept. The
yardstick for determining fairness will still continue to be a variable
one, depending as it does on the economics of a particular situation." 3 Perhaps this will always be so. However, as economic requirements develop into rules of law it should at least become possible to formulate the yardstick for the particular situation with
greater ease.
according to which class of preferred stock they held, to units consisting of
one share of new three dollar preferred stock and one share of new common stock. Such rights "to expire sixty days after formal announcement
that new securities provided for by the Plan are available for distribution."
Petition, id. 10.
112However, the price should be such as not to prevent new financing
by the3 sale of stock.
1 The writer has recently expressed it: "We constantly search for
some way of formulating a yard stick with which to measure all corporate
reorganization plans. We can formulate such a yard stick for a particular
situation-a simple plan against which to test all others. As for a general
yard stick (and that is what a yard stick should be), it has been aptly said
that yard sticks which can now be formulated resemble degrees of latitude
which vary with the longitude-in other words, it is the particular situation
which governs." Book Review (1935) 30 I1. L. Rev. 254, 255.

